

## ANATOMY OF FREEDOM

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An attempt is made to strictly systematize all available interpretations of the concept of freedom on the basis of the original ontological model previously proposed by the author. The connection of freedom with the phenomena of dependence, passive resistance, active behavior, self-determination, self-will is traced. Based on the proposed system, the mechanism of origin is demonstrated not only for almost all the interpretations of freedom already available in the philosophical heritage, but also for a number of new ones that have not been emphasized and studied before.

It is intended for all those interested in the problem of the philosophical interpretation of freedom, as well as supporters of the construction of philosophical research on strict grounds.

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The contrast between teleology and mechanism is, first of all, the more universal opposite of freedom and necessity.

Hegel

The philosophical interpretation of freedom is one of the so-called "cursed" problems, about which spears have long been broken and around which an impressive pile of definitions, interpretations and concepts has been piling up since time immemorial. Therefore, here we are dealing with a case where an attempt to seek help in understanding this problem from experienced authorities does not always lead to clarification of the situation. The following examples are very indicative in this regard. Thus, Holbach argued that "a person is not free for a single minute of his life" [1]. J. P. Sartre held a different opinion: 'We are freedom that chooses..., we are condemned to freedom' [2]. F. Engels was convinced of the liberating role of knowledge for a person, believed that every step of a social person along the path of culture is a step towards freedom [3]. The most prominent irrationalists, 'critics of science', such as K. Jaspers, G. Marcuse and S. Kierkegaard, on the contrary, believed that the development of knowledge, the increasing emphasis on reason, rationalism over time contribute to the reduction, shackling of human freedom [4]. As we can see, the statements of famous thinkers are often of the opposite nature. Nevertheless, paradoxically, it should be recognized that each of them was right in his own way.

The problem is that different authors tended to put their own special, private meaning into the interpretation of the category 'freedom'. Therefore, in our opinion, the development of a fundamental view of the problem of freedom should be preceded, first of all, by a thorough work on the systematization of all its semantic shades available in the philosophical heritage. This work was conceived precisely as one of the steps on this path, as an attempt at this kind of systematization, which naturally develops on the basis of a special vision of the situation brought by the vortex causal model of self-organization [5].

It would be natural to start the research with elementary situations. In natural science and technology, when it comes to the interaction of any two separate objects or entities, the concept of freedom often accompanies the concepts of 'relation', 'connection', 'dependence'. At the same time, it is appropriate to cite Hegel's explanation: 'A relationship is a relationship between two parties that, having an independent existence, are partly indifferent to each other, and partly exist only thanks to each other and only in the unity of this mutual certainty' [6]. From this definition, it is obvious that freedom (mutual 'indifference' of the two sides) and connection are nothing more than a pair of categories designed to quantitatively characterize the fundamental property of any pair of real objects (separate real entities) - to have a mutual relationship. This pair of categories allows you to evaluate the measure, the degree of fullness, the weight of the 'relation' property. The relationship can be low-intensity, even absolutely neutral, zero (between two people - cold, alienated). Then it is appropriate to talk about the absence of any noticeable connection and, accordingly, the presence of a high degree of mutual freedom. On the contrary, a high-intensity, very close, high-intensity relationship is characterized by the presence of a strong, strong (in technology - rigid) connection and, accordingly, a minimum or lack of freedom. Generally speaking, most of the binary relations that take place in reality (between two entities) occupy one or another intermediate position between these extreme cases and are characterized by one or another specific ratio of the volumes (scales) of connection and freedom. Obviously, in this case, freedom can be interpreted differently as the mutual isolation of the two sides, acting as the 'reverse side of the connection' [7]. If we use the definition of the famous Soviet philosopher A. Spirkin, who interpreted communication as 'the dependence of one phenomenon on another in any respect' [8], then a successful synonym for such freedom can be recognized as 'independence'.

Moreover, this independence is, we emphasize, private, relative, purely specific, characteristic only for this binary relation. This understanding was close to Hobbes, who emphasized that the concept of freedom 'can be applied to unintelligent creatures and inanimate objects no less than to intelligent beings' [9]. He gave an example when water previously contained in a vessel is released if the vessel is broken. He also noted that a person 'can be free in one respect and not free in another' [10].

Freedom as a category that characterizes the degree of isolation, independence of one subject from another and opposes binary dependence, connectedness, determinism, if you look at it, can easily be formalized, included in the "zone of action" of the apparatus of set theory and mathematical logic. This circumstance objectively contributes to the transformation of the corresponding section of philosophy into a full-fledged science based on the use of mathematical research methods. Below we will try to prove that all the other numerous interpretations of freedom are derived from this one, and therefore can also eventually be investigated by modern scientific methods.

Every real object is usually surrounded by many other objects of the real world and with a well-defined number of them is in one or another direct relationship. If all these relations concerning this subject are summarized, grouped and further considered as a single integral aggregate, then it becomes possible to introduce new, aggregate interpretations of dependence and freedom. With their help, we can already talk about a particular total (integral) relationship of each individual object with the rest of the surrounding external world. At the same time, instead of a set of binary relations between individual objects, we will have to deal with just one generalized relationship - between this object and the external environment. The latter two act as integral entities that interact with each other and have a certain total (integral) dependence and freedom in relation to each other.

In principle, it is not a problem to imagine mentally a certain object that is completely independent in relation to all other surrounding entities of the real world, that is, absolutely free. However, the principle of determinism, the laws of conservation and the fact of the activity of the environment exclude such a situation in reality. Only a certain approximation to this limiting case is achievable. You can also mentally imagine an object that is completely dependent on the

outside world, deprived of absolutely any freedom. But in this case, firstly, it makes no sense to separate this subject into a separate entity. Secondly, if we exclude the freedom of a given object in relation to any part of the external world, that is, to recognize it as dependent on all external real entities in general, then we will come to an impossible situation where the entire real world would be connected, through the medium of this object, into one rigid, completely deprived of freedom whole. Thus, we have to admit that these extremes can exist only as unattainable ultimate abstractions. Each individual object can be characterized by one or another degree of connectedness with the outside world and freedom from it, different from zero and from the absolute.

In the light of the above, it is appropriate to talk about the partial determinability of any individual object by the external world. To recreate the picture of its complete, integral determination, we will have to recognize the presence of special internal determinants inherent only in this subject. This circumstance, we emphasize, does not contradict the principle of the material unity of the world. Being a part of the whole real world and a product of the prehistory of the current moment of the latter, a separate object is at the same time a kind of whole that stands out from the rest of the world, a unique product of the prehistory of a number of elements of matter that make up only itself and its immediate environment. Consequently, there is a determinant duality here - an effect generated by "groupism" in the interactions of the determinants of the real world. When considering specific models of real objects, researchers inevitably encounter, respectively, causal duality. Since with this approach it is necessary to recognize each individual object as both a part and a whole, this means that it is impossible to reduce it to something completely functionally primary or secondary, which can be defined as functional duality.

As for the nature of the impact on the subject of internal determinants, it is worth dwelling on this in particular. Let's consider such an example. It is noticed that in the field of action of the same external gravitational forces, a heavier body bends its trajectory to a lesser extent than a lighter one. This is due to the fact that the first has a greater amount of inertia. Further, with the same external mechanical action, wood breaks, but steel does not. With a known thermal effect, the paper ignites, and the water does not burn. Under electric voltage, the metal conducts current, and the dielectric does not conduct. If you think about it, all these reactions can be combined on the basis of recognizing one common fundamental property of all material objects - passive resistance to external influences under the influence of their own internal determinants. Of all the possible types of passive resistance, it is perhaps worth highlighting inertia, which M. Bunge considered a manifestation of self-movement in mechanics [11]. To date, inertia has been thoroughly studied, so it is very convenient to consider it as a standard of passive resistance in general. Adopting the method of analogy, we consider it legitimate in this case to recognize the laws of mechanics concerning inertia as valid for other types of passive resistance. At the same time, of course, it is necessary to expand the area of their action, their formulations accordingly, to transfer the latter to all other possible properties of real objects and processes.

So, for example, the law of inertia in the expansion version will sound something like this: every real object or process in the absence of external influences retains the same, unchanged appearance and the same dynamics of movements in accordance with the structure of its internal determinants. Newton's second law can be extended as follows: the dynamics of changes caused by an external influence on a given object or process is directly proportional to the force of the impact and inversely proportional to the magnitude of passive resistance (inertia). Other laws and regularities can be reformulated in a similar way. We consider it our duty to note that, in our opinion, there is an urgent need for a thorough promotion of the philosophical concept of determinism in this direction. The corresponding work would allow, at least, to bring philosophy in this area of knowledge in line with the achievements of the natural sciences.

Along with the above, there is a special category of material formations that have the property of not only passive, but also active resistance. Moreover, these formations are generally endowed with the ability to active behavior, often not provoked by external determinants in any way. We

are talking about self-organizing systems (abbreviated as SS). As for all other real entities, they are characterized by determinant duality. But unlike other entities whose internal determinants are static or are in uniform motion, the SS is characterized by the involvement of its internal determinants in a closed exchange movement, in a circulating flow-a vortex. That is why the SS can make independent, expedient movements caused by this internal deterministic vortex, can actively avoid harmful and dangerous external influences, bypass and eliminate obstacles, as well as actively seek and establish favorable and useful connections. Thus, the SS can actively, at its discretion, regulate binary relations with individual objects of the external world, independently fill them with the desired amount of interdependence or freedom. The same applies to the total (integral) values of connection and freedom in relation to the entire surrounding world as a whole. The SS can voluntarily withdraw into itself to a greater or lesser extent or open up to the world, thereby actively regulating these values.

Man as an object of study has long attracted the attention of philosophers. In this regard, the problem of the total dependence and freedom of the human subject has been repeatedly subjected to attempts to cover it from different sides. Thus, Democritus used the term 'necessity', meaning by it total determinism, and pointed out a clear division of this necessity into external and internal [12]. At the same time, external necessity, according to him, makes its way through the medium of connections. The individual is out of ties, he stressed, inaccessible to the subordinating external necessity, and therefore free [13]. Much later, this view was developed by E. Fromm, who pointed out that by eliminating all forms of dependence on other people and social structures, a person becomes free, but this freedom turns into loneliness for him. Thus, in his opinion, a person is free - 'this means that he is alone' [14]. Freedom here is understood as independence from external influence, from external necessity, which, if you look at it, automatically implies that the subject is subject exclusively to internal necessity, to influence from within. The latter circumstance, apparently, gave rise to a number of researchers to directly define the freedom of the subject as an internal, immanent determinism. Thus, Spinoza left us the following definition: 'I call free such a thing that exists and acts according to a necessity that follows only from its own nature...' [15]. Hegel also drew attention to this tendency: "When they talk about necessity, they usually understand by this determination from the outside..." [16]. This, in his opinion, should be distinguished from internal necessity, which is freedom. It should be noted, by the way, that it was Hegel who for the first time in the history of philosophy began to consider necessity and freedom as a pair of categories that are in dialectical unity [17]. In the same spirit, as applied to man, Holbach reasoned: "For a person, freedom is nothing but a necessity contained in himself" [18].

Consistent continuity is demonstrated in this issue by the famous realist philosopher of the 20th century M. Bunge, who noted that freedom 'consists in a natural self-determination that exists at any level of reality' [19]. Synonyms of freedom, in the understanding of these thinkers, are the unhindered self-realization of the subject, the spontaneous, spontaneous manifestation of his unique nature. A similar understanding of freedom in relation to the existence of a person in the external environment ('existence') was expounded by M. Heidegger; in particular, argued that if you build behavior in accordance with your personality, then actions will be free [20]. However, this free self-realization of a person is hindered by various stable circumstances of the natural and social life surrounding him. When, under the influence of the developing inner need for a more complete and large-scale self-realization, a person realizes "transcendence", that is, breaks through certain limits of the established external environment, the usual external everyday life, goes beyond them, then, according to Heidegger, the freedom of human existence reveals itself in practice [21].

The study of the foundations of human behavior gave rise, among other things, to the concept of will, which serves to denote the ability to choose the goal of activity and the internal efforts necessary for its implementation [22]. Somehow, historically, this concept traditionally covers, in fact, two different functions, two special types of activity. Indeed, the ability to choose a goal implies, if you look at it, selective activity, and the ability to make internal efforts necessary for

the implementation of an already set goal can be legitimately classified as a type of motor activity. These two functions in different people by nature can be expressed in different ways, and therefore it is customary to talk about such types of personality as 'leader' and 'performer'. The mixing of these two functions contributes to a certain confusion, so we consider it appropriate to use two more precise concepts instead of the one hitherto accepted: 'electing will' and 'moving will'.

In the context of this work, we are primarily interested in what is related to the concept of the electing will. For a long time, spears have been broken about whether this will is determined by something and somehow or whether it is free. In this regard, two trends have emerged in philosophy - indeterminism and determinism [23]. Representatives of the first, to which Socrates, Plato, medieval scholastics, I. G. Fichte, M., F. Men de Biran, as well as Sartre and Camus, considered the will of man free, and representatives of the second, such as Leibniz, A. Collins, J. Priestley, D. Hume, Spinoza and Holbach, on the contrary, characterized the will as an absolutely deterministic principle and regarded man in this regard as a 'necessary agent' [24]. "Under the assumption of free will," Schopenhauer noted, among other things, "any human action would be an inexplicable miracle-an action without a reason" [25].

What is the reason for such radical differences? In our opinion, the presence of discrepancies in the interpretation of the concept of freedom played a cruel joke with scientists here. As already noted above, many thinkers were inclined to understand freedom as independence from everything external, therefore, subjection exclusively to their inner nature. Therefore, they interpreted free will only as self-will and stopped there, without trying to get into the essence of the matter deeper. On this occasion, L. Buchner aptly stated that freedom is understood as a situation when "people are aware of their desire and are not aware of the reasons that motivate them to want" [26]. In reality, we are dealing here only with the illusion of freedom, which is immediately destroyed if the sources of human 'desires' are subjected to any rigorous analysis. Thus, in this dispute, we are on the side of the determinists who interpret freedom in the absolute sense as pure independence from everything in general, both external and internal. Obviously, in the conditions of such freedom, any action would be an action without a reason. Therefore, we should agree with the determinists that absolute free will is impossible.

Let us dwell in more detail on the illumination of the phenomenon of internal impulses of the will. J. Priestley, D. Hume and Holbach directly said that motives act as sources, real and necessary reasons for human actions [27]. Moreover, these motives can be of different nature. A. Collins concretizes: 'Our passions, desires, feelings and reason determine us in our choice' [28]. Indeed, each of us can cite a lot of facts when certain actions of people were determined by the dictate of reason, a hint of feeling, a physiological need, an affect. In most cases, a person's decision is preceded by an act of collision and confrontation of two or more different motives, a kind of battle for the possession of power over the mortal body for a certain period of time. The outcome of the battle can be marked either by the victory of one motive or a group of motives and the subsequent dominance of the latter during a given action or a series of actions, or by some form of compromise. In the latter case, human actions are determined simultaneously by a whole complex, a synthesis of motives. Sometimes a person is tormented by doubts. Obviously, this happens in the conditions of a protracted battle between comparable motives or their groups, when neither side can get a decisive advantage.

The problem of the clash of motives received some coverage from S. Freud. The latter, as is known, paid much attention to the study of collisions between conscious and unconscious motives, emphasized the results of such collisions and their consequences for the human psyche. The evidence of the presence of this kind of collisions inevitably suggests the existence of a special point in the complex structure of the human brain, where signals carrying information about motives of different nature should converge. Apparently, these signals must first be brought to a certain common denominator, to a single invariant form that allows for the possibility of comparing their strength and intensity. As a result of a special act of comparative

weighing of the intensity of signals, the center that controls human behavior receives an appropriate orientation. This is the act of the electing will.

Motives, if you look at them, also arise, in turn, not from scratch. Continuing to dig deeper, it is not difficult to come to the conclusion that every motive is initiated by one or another object or event of the real world. In other words, through the phenomena of reason, emotions, feelings, drives, the specific interests of real objects are seen. The simplest model of a self-organizing system proposed by us earlier [29] provides for a natural ontological division of the real world, in connection with the existence of each self-organizing system, into two relatively autonomous parts: internal and external. This makes it possible to make an appropriate classification among the many motives of human activity. Namely, one part of the whole set of motives should be interpreted as conditioned by internal interests, and the other—as initiated by external circumstances.

Thus, it turns out that through the medium of motives, there is often a struggle for control of a person's actions between internal and external principles. As a result, a person acts either purely in his own personal interests, then in the interests of other people, social groups, the state, objects of the surrounding nature (within the framework of, say, an environmental movement, a movement for the preservation of cultural monuments), then enters into a compromise between internal and external. For example, a person's economic activity is associated with the production of goods for other people and at the same time implies in response to this receiving an appropriate set and volume of goods for himself.

If in the latter case a person's behavior is determined by both principles at the same time, then in the first two, when one group of motives clearly dominates, it can be argued that a person eventually becomes alienated from another group, becomes independent, free in relation to it. In this regard, there is a reason to introduce the concept of private, relative freedom into consideration. We have already discussed above about private, relative freedom in binary relations between individual objects of the real world. In this case, this freedom concerns two integral sets of determinants: internal and external. So it should be recognized that it is of an aggregate nature, can be reduced to the sum of binary partial freedoms of individual elements. At the same time, freedom from the external principle is inextricably combined with dependence on the internal, and vice versa. Of course, this freedom is valid only for the period of time as long as the balance of forces among the motives achieved as a result of the next collision is preserved. As soon as the balance of forces changes, a new version of private freedom is born as a result of a new clash of motives. However, there are also stable trends in people's behavior. For example, an egoist is characterized by a persistent desire to be as free as possible from external influences. On the contrary, the altruist tries to free himself as much as possible from the oppression of personal needs.

It has to be stated that a significant number of thinkers and scientists understood freedom as egoistic private freedom from everything external. Freedom of will in this case naturally acted as self-will. It is not surprising that these scientists could not find a common language with those who interpreted freedom in an absolute key.

To begin with, at this stage of research on the private, relative freedom of the subject, it would be possible to stop. However, since we have already proposed a second, more complex and more adequate ontological model of a self-organizing system [30], we believe it is necessary to bring the corresponding system of private freedoms as well.

Recall that the above-mentioned second model provides for a natural decomposition of the picture of the existence of the real world, in connection with the existence and functioning of the SS, into four separate areas. Accordingly, it becomes possible to talk about four special principles in the private being of the subject: immanent, formed and brought up in it by external conditions, natural and cultural (a fragment of which, in particular, is the socio-cultural

principle), transcendent. Generally speaking, the normal behavior of the subject is characterized by the fact of a mixed determination of his will, when all four principles take part in this matter - alternately, all together or in various combinations. However, as for individual behavioral acts, actions, an incomplete set of these principles may take part in their determination. A particular action may be the result of the influence of only one, two or three of them on the will of the subject. At the same time, those principles that did not take part in the determination of this action, naturally, do not connect this action in any way. Therefore, we can talk about the private, relative freedom of the subject's will in relation to the latter. This kind of free will, in the sphere of action of which one or another combination of the four principles mentioned is always found, can be quite strictly investigated and classified. In such cases, it is advisable to use elements of mathematical combinatorics. The sum of all possible combinations of four elements is calculated simply:

$$C_4^0 + C_4^1 + C_4^2 + C_4^3 + C_4^4 = 1+4+6+4+1 = 16$$

So, we have 16 possible options for determining the will and, accordingly, the same number of options for private free will. If we take into account the conclusion made above about the impossibility of absolute free will, then the first term of this sum should be excluded. As a result, there are only 15 options left, each of which can be described in detail and interpreted in detail if desired. Here we will look at just some of them for example.

1. Let us assume that the will is determined by only one immanent principle and, accordingly, is free in relation to the other three. In this case, the subject is driven solely by internal motives, initial needs. He is alienated from everything external and everything initiated, developed, and educated by this external in himself. If such a situation is strongly expressed in the behavior of a person, then the latter can be attributed to the type of uncivilized, primitive savage. In philosophy, Fichte tried to absolutize this version of free will: 'I want to be the master of nature, and she should be my servant, I want to have an influence on nature corresponding to my strength, but she should have no influence on me' [31]. The ideal of a strong man who rejects morality and subordinates everything around him to his will, which was praised by Nietzsche, is also tied to this variant. The absolutization of this variant was a characteristic feature for that branch of the school of "philosophy of life", which can be classified as primitive subjectivism.

2. Let the will be determined by immanent and educated principles and is free in relation to everything external. This option differs from the previous one in the well-mannered, cultured, civilized and adaptable behavior of the subject. Along with the primary initial needs, they are driven by the needs acquired, educated, formed under the influence of the natural and social environment. However, subordination only to internal motives and alienation from external ones make the corresponding act a manifestation of subjectivism. Under the same name, a variant of the determination of the will is known, which is absolutized by a number of philosophical trends. Hypertrophied active role of the subject, leading to subjectivism, is more or less characteristic of Berkeley, Hume, neo-Kantianism, empiriocriticism, philosophy of life, pragmatism, neo-positivism, existentialism. In social science and ethics, this view of things contributed to the apology of individualism.

3. A curious case is when the will is determined by the natural-cultural (socio-cultural) principle and is free in relation to the rest. In this case, the subject does not differ in principle from the surrounding objects deprived of the properties of self-organization. He is devoid of any activity of his own, acts only at the will of external forces and circumstances. Such a passive subject, deprived of subjective freedom, is dominated by external necessity. According to a number of representatives of Western philosophy, in particular supporters of irrationalism, this is the situation that prevails now in the civilized world: the human will, individuality are dissolved in external norms, conditions, generally accepted standards and stereotypes, and a person turns into

a passive consumer and contemplator. The absolutization of this aspect in the behavior of the subject leads to objectivism. To a certain extent, Marxism-Leninism sins with objectivism - it is enough to recall its denial of the existence of any special internal causality, as well as its concept of freedom as a recognized necessity.

4. The case when the will is determined by the transcendental principle alone is not so obvious in the interpretation. Here we take into account only the real transcendental principle emanating from the part of the real world that is not developed by the subject, and we do not yet take into account the transcendental phenomena of psychic origin. So for this case, it is necessary to recognize the special behavior of the subject as characteristic, when the latter is driven by curiosity, the desire to discover, get and feel new, previously hidden and unknown. As an element of normal behavior, this trend is represented on a fairly large scale in the existence of subjects. As for human society, there is always a special group of creative figures, discoverers and innovators who specialize in finding and creating new things in different spheres of life. This detachment contributes to the steady expansion of the sphere of being of a social subject. The absolutization of this trend, in particular, was the basis for scientism - an exaggerated assessment of the role of science. Until recently, this was the sin of the domestic Marxist-Leninist philosophy, which tried to interpret cognition as the main function of a person, and the need to know as the main need.

5. The opposite case deserves attention, when the will is free from the transcendent principle and is determined by the other three. The corresponding behavior is characterized by isolation on the usual, traditionally established realities and norms, conservatism. The absolutization of this state of affairs leads to the domination of the metaphysical worldview, to dogmatism, skepticism, positivism, pragmatism.

6. It is also impossible to ignore the case when the will is determined by all four principles. The behavior of the subject in this case is characterized as the most compromise, linked to all the present motives. At the same time, to a certain extent, the interests of all the parties involved and the principles are respected. If you look at it, this type of behavior occupies the most significant place in the lives of people and societies. Liberation, alienation from one or another of these four principles most often occurs in special extreme situations, when the ratio of the strength of motives that has changed over time requires a reassessment and the establishment of a new type of compromise.

So, we stated above that the private being of any SS can be characterized by fifteen variants of determinism and free will. It would be possible to stop there. However, the increased interest in the existence of highly organized forms of SS makes it necessary to continue the research. It is quite obvious that complex SS also have more complex behavior. When an animal is taken as the object of consideration, there are grounds to take into account the fact that such a phenomenon as his psyche is already isolated into a special relatively autonomous entity capable of exerting its own deterministic influence on behavior. Anger, fear, rage, delight, love can determine individual actions of an animal, sometimes going against its trivial internal motives and needs. Experience, character, temperament brings specific features to the behavior of an individual. This gives grounds for complicating the model of being by dividing the previously emphasized inner principle (both immanent and educated) into two relatively autonomous parts: physiological and mental. It is not difficult to realize that such a complicated model provides for an increased number of possible variants of the determinism of the animal's will, as well as, accordingly, its freedom. This number can be strictly deduced by a detailed analysis of this model.



If we aim at a more detailed and adequate study of the existence of such highly organized SS as a person and society, then here, in addition to the previous one, there are grounds for distinguishing such a part of the psyche as consciousness into a special relatively autonomous entity capable of independently influencing behavior, the orientation of the will. Taking into account this allocation, the number of possible variants of determinism and private free will in the model of being increases even more. At the same time, the model becomes very much more complicated. However, any of these options can still be written out strictly and definitely and, if desired, interpreted in detail. The size of the study does not allow us to do all this here, and we do not set such a task for ourselves. In fact, the problem of identifying and interpreting all these options is almost purely technical.

It can only be pointed out that among these variants there will be those that served as the basis for the emergence of a number of well-known interpretations of freedom, in particular, freedom of the mental in relation to the physical in the understanding of Sigmund Freud; freedom of consciousness in relation to physical being, on which J.-P. Sartre focused attention; freedom of the moral sage, consciously obeying the laws of nature and acting accordingly to the cosmic order, in the understanding of the early Stoics and Epicurus; freedom as a moral necessity, the desire to be determined by reason for the better in the interpretation of Leibniz; freedom as a recognized necessity—a consequence of the dictate of the cognizing consciousness—in the exposition of Spinoza, Fichte, Marx, Engels and Lenin; freedom as a kind of irrational principle opposed to everything rational, in the interpretation of K. Jaspers, G. Marcuse and S. Kierkegaard; as well as the freedom of religious and mystical consciousness in relation to everyday reality - as the reverse side of the dictate of the phantoms of the psyche and consciousness. Thus, on the basis of the proposed method, it seems possible to reduce literally all known interpretations of freedom, having pretty much supplemented them with a long series of previously not emphasized, to a completely strict and harmonious system of potentially possible options for determining and private free will of a subject endowed with a psyche and consciousness. Generally speaking, if desired, the work on improving and, accordingly, complicating the model of being and behavior of highly organized subjects can be continued for a very long time if we begin to distinguish individual feelings, emotions, needs and aspects of the mind into the category of private determinants of the will. Then, for example, it will be possible to operate with the interpretations of fearlessness - as freedom from the feeling of fear, asceticism - as freedom from the oppression of physiological needs and sensual desires, lawlessness - as freedom from the requirements of laws, retrogrades - as freedom from progress, etc. The total number of possible options for determining and private free will of the subject will increase so much that only a large team of researchers will be able to work on systematization.

Of particular interest is the problem of studying freedom in situations of compromise interaction of two or more principles. Such situations imply the presence of a certain relationship between each individual pair of these principles. And any relationship is associated with a restriction of mutual freedom. Thus, in terms of compromise, we are dealing with limited, conditional, nominal freedom. This latter is a variable, quantitatively variable quantity, a measure of mutual isolation, alienation, independence of the two principles. Depending on the specific situation, the nominal freedom can have a different value within very wide limits: from zero in the conditions of a tight connection to the maximum absolute in the absence of any noticeable connection.

The abundance of various compromise situations is usually saturated with the life of an individual, as well as society. The peculiarity of the interaction of the human and social subject with the surrounding world is well conveyed by the well-known saying of F. Bacon: 'Natura non vincitur nisi parendo' ('One can rule over nature only by obeying it') [32]. Indeed, in an effort to subjugate this nature in a useful way, the creative subject is constantly working to optimize the existing levers of influence on its individual fragments, as well as searching for more powerful levers, for which he is forced to deepen the former and establish new relationships with

previously alien, unexplored and undeveloped objects and processes. As a result, the subject's connections with the outside world are continuously multiplying, strengthening and deepening, and the scale of their interdependence is growing over time.

The totality of the subject's connections with the outside world can be considered as a kind of system of 'channels', the channel of which is formed by the ways of permitted 'action'. The "banks" of these channels compose a variety of prohibitions, restrictions, conditions, threats and yet unexplored realities of the surrounding world. The gradual growth of the interdependence of the subject and certain elements of the external world is illustrated by the deepening of the corresponding channels. At the same time, it becomes increasingly difficult to go beyond each such channel, which corresponds to a decrease in the amount of nominal freedom of the subject. If we estimate the total amount of nominal freedom of the subject within the currently existing system of channels, then we should recognize its decrease over time. However, the relentless work on laying new channels to a certain extent contributes to compensating for this loss.

Obviously, it is this limited and conditioned nominal freedom that Kant had in mind when he argued about the harmony of nature and freedom that characterizes human activity [33]. Schelling also emphasized that human freedom develops not in hostility, but in union with natural necessity [34], therefore, man should be considered in a harmonious connection with the Universe [35]. This truth is becoming particularly relevant today. According to N. Moiseev, in the modern era, the behavior and activity of people should be distinguished by "the search for harmony in the development of Man, his society and Nature" [36].

The interaction of a person with his social environment, the social environment, obviously fits into the same scheme and also implies some nominal, limited and conditioned freedom. Democritus also stated that the freedom of one person is connected with the freedom of society [37]. Kant, who paid much attention to the study of the relationship between man and society, left the following remark in this regard: "The state system is based on the greatest human freedom, according to the laws, thanks to which the freedom of everyone is compatible with the freedom of everyone else... in any case, there is a necessary idea that should be taken as a basis for drawing up not only the constitution of the state, but also any individual law" [38]. A civilized norm-abiding citizen, as Kant noted, performs his duty by obeying a categorical imperative (an unconditional moral law) and only taking into account this condition, within the appropriate framework, allows the free play of his inclinations [39]. This is the nominal, limited and conditioned freedom of a person living in society. Recognizing himself as a legitimate citizen, a person is forced to take into account the existence, needs, will and intentions of other people, various social aggregates and institutions, determines his intentions by this circumstance and, in fact, assumes obligations not to cause damage to all of them in a way not provided for by generally accepted rules, norms, and law. Defining the right, Kant wrote off: 'This is a set of conditions under which the arbitrariness of one is compatible with the arbitrariness of the other from the point of view of the universal law of freedom' [40]. Montesquieu, defining freedom as the right to do everything that is permitted by law, obviously also spoke about the nominal, limited freedom of a public person [41]. A similar view was held by Holbach, who defined freedom as "the opportunity to do everything for one's happiness that the nature of a person living in society allows" [42]. He described the social necessity entangling the nominal freedom of each member of society as follows: 'Education, law, public opinion, example, habit, fear - all these are reasons that should change people, influence their will, forcing them to promote the common good, direct their passions and restrain those that can harm the goals of society' [43].

From the above statements of great thinkers, the ideal of a social structure is quite clearly outlined, in the conditions of which the harmony of nominal, limited and conditioned freedoms of all individual citizens, social aggregates and institutions, that is, all real subjects represented in

human society, is realized and steadily maintained. It is assumed that the gap in the amount of nominal freedom between different subjects, representatives of different categories of the population, should be small. Regarding this ideal, we consider it necessary to note that the latter is not just a kind of pink dream of adherents of the idea of justice. In our opinion, the history of human civilization, passing through a long series of specific ways of social life, demonstrates a steady tendency to approach this ideal. Obvious signs of this are easily detected in the economic, political, ideological, religious, and cultural spheres of life of the world community.

Bearing in mind the economic aspect of social life, it should be recognized that the gap in the amount of nominal freedom between social classes and strata, being maximum in the era of slavery, when the slave had no property and was completely dependent on the owner, then somewhat decreased in the era of feudalism, when the peasant already had some property and ran his own small farm. With the advent of capitalism, a person has gained the potential of free choice: whether to become an employee of an entrepreneur or to carry out any independent economic activity in accordance with their interests and material capabilities. As for the activity of an employee within the framework of a capitalist enterprise, it must be admitted that until now the amount of his nominal economic freedom there has been very small. However, there is evidence that in the modern era there is an increasing need to increase the latter. It is likely that an era is not far off when every employee will have the opportunity to choose at will the appropriate level of responsibility and, consequently, nominal freedom at his workplace. Then there will be a reason to talk about the disappearance of a glaring gap in the volume of nominal freedoms of various categories of the population and the onset of the era of an ideal socio-economic structure.

As for the political aspect of public life, it is impossible not to admit that during the reign of autocracies, aristocracies - any bureaucracies in general - the volume of nominal freedoms of ordinary citizens is very small. At the same time, the volume of nominal freedoms of ruling individuals, groups, strata and classes is overestimated. The gap in the scale of nominal political freedom between individual classes and strata was obviously maximum in the conditions of slavery, then it was somewhat reduced in the era of feudalism and significantly decreased in the conditions of capitalist democracy, when equality of rights and opportunities for all categories of citizens is formally recognized. In fact, however, so far the element of property bureaucracy plays a rather significant role in the political life of developed capitalist countries. However, with the increase in the level of well-being of the mass of ordinary citizens (which is really an observable phenomenon), we can pin certain hopes on the gradual leveling of the role of this element.

In the religious sphere of society, there was also a decisive turn from the bureaucratic tradition to the democratic one. Instead of religions that fixed the privileges of the ruling circles of society 'in heaven', there came truly mass world religions - Christianity, Islam, Buddhism - that equalize all believers 'in the face of God'.

In contrast to the ancient era, when only fear and faith in a "good" ruler were enough as the basis of social stability, over time, the mass of ordinary people began to play an increasingly pronounced self-valuable historical role. Today, any political regime has to take into account this growing mass self-awareness. In the modern era, the ideas of National Socialism, State Socialism, and Communism began to flourish on it. At the same time, the civil unit was no longer meant as a passive 'nothing', but as an active 'something', a convinced carrier and conductor of a certain 'ideological charge'. To control the mass, it is now necessary to convince it, to drag it along, to influence its psyche, consciousness. It is not by chance that the totalitarian regimes of our century attached such great importance to the ideological processing of the masses and spent enormous funds on a propaganda 'machine'. Today, in civilized countries, there

is a constant competitive struggle between several ideologies for influence on the minds of the mass of citizens. This struggle takes place within the framework of the democratic process, is a source of periodic adjustments made to the strategy of social development in accordance with the current balance of ideological views prevailing in the public environment. Every citizen is free to freely choose an ideological platform that is close to him at the moment, openly declare this closeness and demonstrate it at the elections. There has never been such a significant amount of nominal freedom in the field of ideology before.

If in the old days culture and art 'worked' mainly for the ruling aristocracy, then later there was a reorientation first to the circles of 'commoners', and then generally to the widest social strata. Our century is marked by a powerful surge of 'mass culture'. Therefore, the tastes, values and requests of the ordinary mass consumer, who has gained an unprecedented amount of nominal freedom in this area, have been represented on an unprecedented scale in culture and art. Here, apparently, the phenomenon of the increased level of well-being of the general mass of society also played a role. As they say, who pays - he orders the music.

The mentioned aspects of public life in practice are often very closely intertwined and interdependent. There are many examples where positive changes or, conversely, stagnant moments, difficult-to-overcome obstacles in a particular area, respectively, accelerated or delayed development in other areas. In the modern era, military dictatorships in Latin America, religious revanches in Muslim countries, and caste remnants in India seriously hinder their overall development. In our opinion, there are no such major obstacles to development in Russia today. Major structural restructuring in the economy and large-scale, dynamic redistribution of property represent serious problems and are definitely fraught with painful phenomena. But with a fairly harmonious turn of events, these problems are completely surmountable, so there is every reason to consider the hopes for a high dynamism of future development in all spheres of our public life justified.

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